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Is the Anti-Trust Law Anti-Labor?*
Frank E. Horack Jr.

FOR
at least two decades the
anti-trust controversy has been
quiescent. During the i92o's, business was in the saddle and the laws
were forgotten. During the 1930's,
business was in the doldrums and
anti-trust prosecution was either
unnecessary or inadvisable.
With the analysis born of economic necessity, we are today invoking the anti-trust laws as an
agency for the wider distribution
of economic goods. As we return
to this policy we discover business
under the impetus of the old
NRA now thoroughly organized,
and labor grown strong and selfreliant in spite of the adversities
of unemployment and the depression.
Today, membership in a union
is becoming the rule rather than
the exception. Labor leadership
is gaining a maturity of judgment
from experience and is beginning
to feel the sting of responsibility
imposed by power. The judgment
and responsibility of union leadership is today being tested by the
American people. One of those
tests is the unions' response to the
anti-trust prosecutions.
Business management has been
subjected to similar tests. Most of
us recall too painfully the era in
our national life when business so
entrenched itself in the politics
and economy of our nation that it
no longer felt the responsibility
which power implies. We all know
the results. One law after another
* See note to Mr. Epstein's paper, supra At t.

was enacted to force business to
maintain those standards of decency which the American people
demanded but which business
leadership was unwilling or unable to provide.
Labor management is in much
the same position as business management and if it is not alert to
police its own organization against
both the racketeer and the wellintentioned but overzealous advocate, it must face regulation and
limitation as unpleasant to it as
similar regulations have been to
business.
During the early days of the
New Deal, when regulation of
business was going on apace, business stood shoulder to shoulder in
opposition to such legislation as
the SEC, the holding company
bill, and many others. And this
was so, even though many of their
representatives would admit privately that abuses did exist, and
that they were just as eager to
"get" the companies engaging in
the practices as was the government. Yet they felt compelled by
group loyalty to oppose what they
believed because it was proposed
by government.
This united front approach only
convinced Congress that all business was tarred with the same
brush and so the regulations were
made more universal and probably
more drastic than they would have
been had business leaders dealt
with the problem more frankly
and objectively.
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Labor can learn much from the
experience of business. It would
be futile to assert, as some unfortunately have, that all labor unions
are vicious. I think, however, that
it is equally unwise to ascribe absolute purity to unions.
The best defense the labor
movement can receive today is a
defense which protects the appropriate functions of the union and
of properly managed and properly directed union activities and
which is equally forthright in the
elimination of those activities and
those individuals who have used
the union as a machine for the
achievement of individual aims
and private advantage.
It was the desire for a disproportionate private advantage
which brought business into disrepute. A similar desire upon'the
part of labor organizations will
bring public condemnation of the
whole labor movement.
I

The policy of the anti-trust laws
to encourage and to ensure the
free flow of commodities unhampered by combination and restraint must obviously require adjustment to the equal policy of
encouraging combination and restraint among laborers as a means
of gaining adequate bargaining
power between employees and
management. The cases decided
under the Sherman Act have
marked out the relations between
these two policies with care.
Indeed, the decisions have made
it so clear that labor activities
must comply with the mandates
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of the anti-trust laws that our
argument in this paper must necessarily consider whether the Sherman Act should be interpreted to
include union activities rather
than whether it does.
There can be no argument but
that the terms of the original act
included labor unions. The only
question is, what was the effect of
Section 6 of the Clayton Act. It
seems to me that after the uncertainty that was aroused by the
Trans-Missouri' and Standard
Oil2 cases, Congress wished to
make it perfectly clear that the.
existence of a union organization
was not in itself a combination or
conspiracy. In other words, considering the controversy of the
time, Section 6 was put in the act
to make it clear that unionism
as an organization was exempt.
There is no evidence to indicate
that union activities should be
freed from the restrictions of the
act unequivocally, but rather that
only those activities which were
within permissible labor objectives and were accomplished by
permissible means were exempt
from the sanctions of the law.
In short, the object and purpose
of this exception was not to relieve
any and all activity engaged in by
a union from the operation of the
act but rather to make explicit
that the mere organization of a
labor union did not constitute a~a
unlawful conspiracy.
Subsequent decisions and subsequent legislation has emphasized
x. United

States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
290 (1897)2. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States,

Ass'n, z66 U. S.

221 U. S. 1 (1911).
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this basic policy. In the case of
business, similar judicial techniques were followed. The mere
existence of a combination or association was held to be not necessarily undesirable, for it was found
that many associations, indeed,
promoted the distributive process
of our economy.
Thus we have encouraged the
formation of some associations and
prosecuted others-and this with
perfect consistency. Another phase
of business regulation indicates
that we are drawing our judgments more exactly today. At the
same moment we may prosecute
management and protect investors
-a distinction which labor management must anticipate if it insists on the inapplicability of the
anti-trust statutes. Thus when
management fails to assume the
responsibility of protecting investment in either labor or money, it
must itself be regulated.
Labor organizations are meeting this challenge today. During
the period of idealism concerning
the growth of the labor movement,
the labor management and labor
were so consciously associated in
the public mind that an attack on
one was considered an attack on
the other. With a growing frequency, however, we are making
critical distinctions between the
union and the union man. Thus
today many who believe sincerely
in the necessity of higher standards of living and who insist on a
wider and more effective participation by labor in business management may with honesty of purpose subject to criticism some
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union activities. In other words,
just as we found that there were
good and bad trusts, we are finding today that there are good and
bad labor organizations. Unfortunately, the test of good and bad
is essentially subjective and there
will be those who use such a distinction to vilify organizations
that many would consider reputable. Thus we are faced with the
problem of either protecting both
the good and the bad in order to
protect the good or else we must
make more specific the standards
by which we determine those organizations which should be protected and those which should not.
Business management adopted the
first method, and their defeats in
Congress and the state legislatures
bear witness to the ineffectiveness
of this approach. The American
public is too familiar with the
whitewashing process.
For these reasons it seems to me
that it is futile to argue that any
and all labor activity is free from
anti-trust regulation.
Basically the argument for exemption may be stated thus: The
Sherman Act and Clayton Act
confer power which may be
abused. If labor is not exempted
the act provides the way by which
judges may nullify the defensible
advances that labor has made. It
is, of course, true that the act may
be a tool of oppression. Any grant
of power may be abused. Note
that the exemption of unions from
the Sherman Act places power in
the union. And the unions, like
the courts, may abuse that power.
As a consequence our real choice
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is the choice between the possibility of abuse of power by unions
and by the courts. I am not prepared to say that courts will abuse
that power less than unions or that
unions will abuse it more than
courts; but I am prepared to say
that abuse of power by the government may be corrected with
greater expedition and with less
violence than may the abuse of
power by private organizations.
The ability to ferret out private
interests, whether it be the interests of management or the interests of labor will be forever
difficult. The fact that there is
no public responsibility in the
private official which may be
directly called to account makes
it difficult, if not impossible, to
rectify abuses quickly. We witnessed the time and energy involved in the effort to increase the
responsibility of business management in the interest of a satisfactory economic order. As a general
proposition, social responsibility
has not been easy for business to
accept. There is little reason to
believe that responsibility will be
discharged more readily by organizations representative of labor.
Indeed, there is evidence already
of dissatisfaction among the members of labor organizations with
the administration of their unions.
If labor administration is not always faithful to the trust of labor,
there will be times, as there have
been, when it will fail to discharge
its more extensive social obligations. It seems appropriate, therefore, that if power is to be vested
as it must be somewhere, it should
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be vested where responsibility may
be enforced more expeditiously.
It is my own belief that the majority demands of our nation can
be felt more quickly through the
channels of our democratic process than through private organization.
Accepting this premise I shall
assume that the Federal Government can and should, within its
jurisdiction, enforce the Sherman
Act against union management
where the union activity has been
directed toward non-labor objectives. A determination of the
boundary line between proper and
improper union objectives becomes our next and last inquiry.
2

The Sherman Act sought to
protect the American public, particularly the consumers, from unreasonable business advantages
gained through combination. The
experience of the consumers of
America convinced them that business combinations existing for the
purpose of preserving the status
quo usually meant that new products were kept from the market
and that old products were only
procurable at arbitrary prices.
The maintenance of the old system also had undesirable effects
upon labor. Indeed, much labor
legislation grew from the same
popular dissatisfaction with business management. Under the old
system, the production of goods
at substandard wages, unconscionable hours, and intolerable working conditions was the rule. The
participation of labor in business
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agreements was unknown. A better balance between the interests
of management, labor and the
consumer was inevitable. Thus,
business combinations were restricted and labor organization encouraged. The goal, however, in
each instance was the same. Labor
implemented with organization, is
now feeling the same public demand for regulation that business
felt. The scope and extent of that
regulation is thus the next step in
our inquiry.
I think it may be assumed from
the start that the standards of our
public consciousness not only accept but insist today that labor's
wage be adequate to maintain
something more than mere subsistence living; that the working
man is entitled to reasonable
hours of work; that the conditions
under which he works must be
appropriate for the preservation
of his health, and the continuation
of a normal life in our society;
that the interests of the investor
and management do not predominate but that labor shares in management through the channels of
collective bargaining. The limits
of these objectives have been fairly
well marked out, and it is clear
that our legislative policy today
insures these as accepted objectives
for labor organization.
Neither labor objectives nor
the anti-trust statutes can be static,
however. Thus, the existence of
past values does not foreclose the
creation of new labor goals, nor
does the past application of the
Sherman Act necessarily require
similar application in the future.
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To judge present demands solely
in the light of previously accepted
standards is erroneous-to accept
the new demands as valid merely
because they are claimed is equally
unsatisfactory. We must evaluate
them in light of the general objectives of our present society.
Certainly basic to all other
claims is the increase in national
income with its attendant purchasing power. The achievement of
this goal requires, in fact, the inconsistent maintenance or increase
of wages and the reduction in the
cost of finished products. This
result, if obtainable at all, must be
achieved through greater efficiency in the methods of finance,
production and distribution. Thus
when any group, be it management or labor, bands together to
prevent reduction in the cost of
finished products through more
efficient methods they have
blocked one of the basic objectives
of our present society and may
well expect society, through government, to act against them.
The easiest of such cases, a situation which all will agree should
be prohibited, is the case of the
racketeer who sells "protection"
to employers and employees. Although in form a labor union, it
is only a gang in fact. Expenditures forced by such racketeers result in no public good, produce no
economic wealth, and in no way
advances the labor movement.
When such activity affects interstate commerce, there can be no
doubt but that criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act are
appropriate.
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The second situation is some- particular goods, as in the case of
what more difficult. Here a valid prefabricated materials, whether
and legitimate union insists upon produced by union labor or not,
the employment of unnecessary they have exceeded the limit of
men. In this case it is true that a permissible activity. The strike or
union man receives employment boycott under these circumstances
and to that extent the objects of is not to maintain advantageous
the union are advanced. But are working conditions or collective
these defensible objectives? I bargaining, but rather to relieve
doubt it. Through federal and itself from the competition of new
state security laws we have said articles and new methods. In the
that business cannot be capitalized march of progress it would appear
with unnecessary dollars. It seems that neither investment, manageto me that labor must accept the ment, nor labor should be free
same standard and not capitalize from the pressure of competition.
The social benefit from increased
itself with unnecessary labor.
It must, of course, be recog- productivity at lower costs does
nized that the statement of this not permit of the maintenance of
general principle will not decide feudal tenures by artificial tariffs
the close question whether the created by the combination of speemployee is unnecessary or cial interests.
The fourth situation results from
whether in fact the refusal of ema
combination of labor and manployment results in the speed-up
agement
to maintain the position
or in increased hazards to health
of
a
particular
industry. This
and safety. The decision of this
question, it seems to me, cannot usually means the maintenance of
be left successfully to interested artificially fixed prices. In one
parties, but must be decided by sense this may be said to be a
"'valid" labor objective, inasmuch
specially trained tribunals.
A third situation potentially in- as the continuity of employment
jurious to the economic system is and the maintenance of existing
the employment of labor under wage scales gives labor a direct
antiquated production methods or interest in production, prices, and
for the production of unnecessary profits. If this is so, and it seems
products. It may be objected that to be, we must first make certain
business is permitted to continue revisions in the old assumption
uneconomical practices and there- that management and labor are
fore labor may do likewise. This constantly antagonistic. It apis not quite accurate. Business may pears, here, that, as against concontinue uneconomical practices, sumers, the interests of labor and
individually. So can labor. But management are identical-whatneither can combine to force upon ever their own marital disputes
competitors and the public the may be.
cost of these practices.
Thus it would seem that this
Thus where a union boycotts was a valid labor objective and
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therefore immune from prosecution under the Sherman Act. This,
too, is too easy a conclusion. The
maintenance of artificial prices by
management acting in combination in unreasonable restraint of
trade has not been sanctioned. It
is doubted that management could
defend an action against it on the
ground that its labor would strike
unless it continued the practices.
It likewise may be doubted
whether labor would be privileged
directly. The exemptions in the
Clayton Act were directed at the
existence of the labor organization itself-disputes between labor
and management were privileged
-there is nothing in the act itself
to indicate a legislative intent to
permit labor to combine with
management to gain advantage
over other competitors.
The fifth, and indeed the most
difficult problem is whether the
strike or boycott in furtherance of
a jurisdictional dispute amounts
to an unreasonable restraint violative of the anti-trust laws. When
it is a dispute between an employer and his employees and
seeks "recognition" for collective
bargaining it appears to have all
the objectives which have been
permissible under the existing decisions. It is true, of course, that,
at the time the exemption of
unions was written into the antitrust laws, no legislative intent
could be said to have anticipated
this problem. Thus, as a matter
of strict statutory interpretation,
the jurisdictional dispute may be
said to be outside the exemption. But strict interpretation can
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hardly be favored in this situation,
so it may be concluded that although the result of a jurisdictional dispute is extremely unfair
to an employer who has signed an
agreement with one bargaining
agency it is hardly within the
sphere of anti-trust regulation.
Legislation should be enacted to
correct this obvious abuse, but the
anti-trust laws seem hardly avail-

able to accomplish this result even
though admittedly desirable.
3
In conclusion, the problem that
we are wrestling with is more extensive in coverage than either the
anti-trust or labor policy of the
Federal Government. We are
really concerned with how these
two particular manifestations of
our basic policy can be coordinated to achieve a maximum of
economic stability with a minimum of discord to either labor or
business.
It seems to me that both business and labor have proceeded on
the theory that they distribute
their products to essentially wellto-do or wealthy persons, persons
who can afford to pay all the traffic
will bear. Actually the consumers
of America are laborers, most of
whom are receiving salaries considerably below $2,500 a year.

This is the group that buys the
automobiles, the radios, the furniture and the homes that industry
produces. If industry maintains
high prices it is labor who pays.
If labor maintains high cost of
production, labor pays. Most of
the homes built in America are
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built by laboring men for laboring men. If the costs are high,
labor bears the burden.
Thus labor, though it has
achieved much by collective bargaining to prevent labor from
competing with itself directly, has
transferred the competition between itself so that the profit of
one becomes the burden of another. I suppose such competition
never can be eliminated. But unreasonable burdens can and should
be prevented. To the laborer who
must pay more than a product is
worth, the injury is the samewhether it is inflicted by management or labor is of no consequence.
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Consequently, viewed from the
broad basis of our national economy and judged from the narrow
base of the purpose of the Sherman Act itself it is apparent that
whenever business management or
labor demands special privilege
and seeks to enforce it by unreasonable restraints on trade and
commerce it is the responsibility
of government to prevent it.
Abuses there may be-no system is
immune. But the ability of the
democratic process to control
abuse more readily through government sustains the wisdom of
policing human greed through
governmental channels.

